Luis Fernández Moreno. 2016. The Reference of Natural Kind Terms by Fernández, Ainhoa
262 Book Reviews
Theoria 32/2 (2017): 257-264
Luis Fernández Moreno. 2016. The Reference of Natural Kind Terms. Bern: Peter Lang.
Reference is a central topic in contemporary philosophy of language. The discussion sur-
rounding natural kind terms (NKT), beginning with Mill, can already be regarded as a 
classic topic in philosophy. The concern of language philosophers with regard to NKT 
not only relates to their semantics but also to determining their reference. The reference of 
NKT is at the center of debate since the appearance of Kripe’s and Putnam’s causal the-
ories, emerging in reaction to descriptivist theories of reference. The principal actors in 
the discussion on the reference of NKT have been philosophers such as Kripke, Putnam, 
D onnellan, Searle and Strawson and, more recently, Jackson, Devitt, Sterelny, Soames, 
LaPorte and Wikforss, among others. This new book by Luis Fernández Moreno (FM) 
emerges within this context, having previously dealt with the problem of the reference of 
proper names (2006 The Reference of Proper Names); as well as the reference of NKT in nu-
merous papers. In The Reference of Natural Kind Terms, FM discusses the problem of de-
termining the reference of NKT by analyzing the most relevant versions of the main types 
of theories in the matter: causal (or historical-causal) and descriptivist theories of reference 
for NKT. This detailed and conceptually demanding analysis is carried out displaying a 
clear predilection for descriptivist theories, but stating that the differences between both 
types of theories are not as great as usually considered.
The book consists of eight chapters. The first is devoted to Locke’s theory of NKT. 
FM explains the types of ideas contained in this theory, including the types of ideas of sub-
stances, and develops the criteria for evaluating them according to their clarity, distinction, 
reality, adequacy and truth. Locke uses the first two criteria together, and FM maintains 
that the last three also fail to be independent of one other (understanding the true criterion 
as being conformity). FM maintains that, considering that the adequacy of an idea of sub-
stance adds the degree of conformity to its reality but its truth adds nothing to its reality, 
we should claim that if an idea of substance is real or adequate, then it will be true.
In the second chapter, FM addresses the theory of general terms proposed by Mill, 
when applied to NKT. He maintains that Mill’s generic theory for general terms does not 
coincide with his theory on NKT and that, therefore, Kripke’s objections based on the lat-
ter’s main thesis would not affect Mill’s theory. This would not be a descriptive theory, as 
Kripke asserts, who must have misinterpreted Mill, probably due to an inconsistency com-
mitted by Mill that results in the principle according to which connotation determines de-
notation not applying to NKT (which should apply if we consider them as general terms 
and therefore connotative, according to Mill).
In the third chapter FM deals with Frege’s and Russell’s theories of singular terms, of 
proper names and also of general terms. He compares the two theories with Mill’s and ac-
cepts Kripke’s interpretation of them as descriptivist theories.
The fourth and fifth chapters are devoted to the Kripke and Putnam theories, respec-
tively. In chapter four, FM argues that ostensive reference fixing in Kripke’s theory must be 
descriptive-causal, discusses the role of essentialism in the thesis of the necessity for theoret-
ical identities, and deals with Kripke’s explanation of reference change, concluding that it is 
compatible with descriptivism. In the fifth chapter, FM maintains that the ostensive refer-
ence fixing in Putnam’s theory must be descriptive-causal too and develops in a final appen-
dix a view about the semantics of artifactual kind terms (like “chair” or “pencil”) consisting 
of an extension of the Putnam’s semantics for NKT to artifactual kind terms.
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Chapter six poses whether it is possible for Locke’s theory to adopt the basic principles 
of causal theories, the contribution of society, and the contribution of the environment for 
the determination of reference. It concludes that Locke’s position is incompatible with this 
last notion.
In the seventh chapter, FM analyzes the main contemporary versions of the descriptiv-
ist theories (Searle, Strawson, Jackson) and pays close attention to Jackson’s proposal, for 
whose causal descriptivism he does not conceal his sympathy. He also deals with Lewis’ and 
Kroon’s descriptivist theories.
In the eighth and final chapter, FM deals with the qua problem, develops Devitt and 
Sterelny’s vision regarding ostensive reference fixing, allowing us to solve it, and asserts 
that Putnam’s theory also provides resources for doing so. FM also argues that the theory 
of reference borrowing in Kripke and Putnam must be descriptive-causal and rejects the es-
sentialism present in Kripke’s theory. Finally, he presents the advances in experimental se-
mantics (Machery et al., Malt) and the discussion that remains in philosophy of chemistry 
on macroscopic and microscopic properties in the individuation of chemical substances. 
The book concludes that the descriptive-causal theory is the most appropriate for both the 
ostensive reference fixing and reference borrowing of natural kind terms.
Taking into account the space for a review, it is impossible to discuss many of the inter-
esting questions appearing in the book here, so I will focus on one of them, relating to one 
of Soames’ criticisms of Jackson’s two-dimensionalism.
In chapter 7, FM attempts to defuse some of Soames’ main arguments against Jackson’s 
two-dimensionality by claiming that the fact that Soames attributes the synonymy between 
simple natural terms and rigid descriptions to Jackson (let’s call this thesis T) is wrong. 
That is, according to Jackson (a) “water” and the description (b) “the actual watery stuff 
of our acquaintance” do not have the same meaning. However, FM’s allegations against 
attributing T to Jackson and his alternative proposal are weak, or of questionable utility. 
First, FM admits that Jackson does keep T in his work prior to 2004, and that it is only in 
later works that he seems to abandon that thesis. If we focus on these later works (2004 
“Why we need a-intensions”; 2010 Language, Names and Information) FM concedes that 
Jackson does not clarify in them what the difference in meaning is between expressions 
sharing the same A-intension as (a) and (b) and that, in general, his notion of meaning and 
synonymy between expressions needs clarification. It seems that attributing the rejection 
of T to Jackson in order to curb Soames’ objections goes hand in hand with having to at-
tribute a confused notion of meaning and synonymy to Jackson.
Second, if (a) and (b) are not synonymous, what is the relationship between the two 
expressions according to Jackson and, above all, according to FM? According to FM, the re-
lationship would consist “only” in the description (b) fixing the reference of the term (a). 
The affinity of meaning would be reduced to (b) fixing the reference of (a) (See p.241, 
note 285). Let us call this thesis R. According to FM, accepting R instead of T would lessen 
some of the forcefulness of Soames’ main objections to Jackson, and two-dimensional de-
scriptivism in general, since the semantic affinity between (a) and (b) required by R is sup-
posed to be much weaker than that of synonymy. Now, R is only misleadingly and superfi-
cially weak in terms of the features of meaning it requires to be recognized as shared by (a) 
and (b); and to that extent, its forcefulness to avoid Soames’ objections diminishes con-
siderably. Let us see, according to Jackson and FM, (b) fixes the reference of (a), at least in 
part, since both have the same A-intension. In fact, they not only have the same A-inten-
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sion, but also the same C-intension. In addition, both Jackson and FM acknowledge that 
competence in the use of (a) requires knowledge (perhaps implicitly) that (a) designates the 
actual watery stuff of our acquaintance. That is, someone competent in (a) is able to know 
that water is the substance possessing the property literally expressed by description (b). 
Given what it is to be competent in (a) and what it is to be competent in (b), it seems that 
it is not possible to be competent in both and not know that both refer to the same, accord-
ing to FM and Jackson. They are expressions that would pass a “quasi-Fregean” test of the 
same cognitive content: a competent English speaker who accepted, under ideal conditions, 
a sentence Sa would also accept the corresponding sentence Sb. If this is not a feature of 
strong semantic affinity between (a) and (b), few features will enjoy such a condition. Thus, 
accepting R implies accepting 1): that (a) and (b) share A- intension, and accept 2) Almost 
every competent English speaker is supposed to have knowledge (perhaps implicit) that 
the term “water” designates the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance. If (1) and (2) are 
true, the semantic features they share, (a) and (b), are not insignificant, but of considerable 
strength. At this point, one may wonder whether the acceptance of 1) and 2), presupposed 
by R, will not suffice to revive the full force of Soames’ objections to Jackson.
While FM’s analysis has a systematic character and offers relevant and original contri-
butions in the final chapters of the book, the chapters dedicated to Mill and Locke, as well 
as chapter six, could perhaps have been included in the chapters devoted to Kripke and 
Putnam, since their contributions are fundamentally related to their theories and are less 
relevant to the current debate on NKT reference than those in the other chapters. Not-
withstanding the foregoing, this book will interest anyone who is immersed in the discus-
sion surrounding the reference of NKT, and is certainly a relevant contribution.
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